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Abstract  
This paper aims to identify attributes of individuals that affect their political 
preferences regarding the dominant party rule in Singapore. In particular, the paper 
focuses on the effects of three socioeconomic attributes—education, income, and 
generation—on people’s preferences for political changes. By using the data from the 
Post-Election Surveys conducted in 2011 and 2015 by the Institute of Policy Studies 
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, this 
empirical examination show that, ceteris paribus, youth and higher levels of 
education enhance positive perceptions of political plurality. The results also indicate 
that income has significant effects, primarily that persons with lower incomes show 
strong support for the status quo, whereas persons with moderate income are more 
inclined to support political plurality. 
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Introduction 
What individual attributes affect attitudes towards a dominant party rule? Who 
supports the status quo under such a rule, and who prefers greater plurality in politics? If 
we identify particular attributes if individuals that are correlated with the preferences for 
plurality, we can better understand the conditions for sustaining the status quo, or for 
fostering political change.  
Modernization theory claims that economic development is the key for changing 
people’s perceptions. Economic development enhances education and produces a middle 
class that holds the values of democratic society (Lipset 1959). On the other hand, a more 
recent school of thought, the so-called ‘new structuralists,’ regards income inequality as 
the main driver of political changes (Boix 2003, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).1 
Aside from education and income, changes in values caused by industrialization 
are another possible factor which affects individual political preferences. Such changes 
in values in a society can be observed as intergenerational differences (Inglehart and 
Welzel 2003).  
These conventional arguments are about macro-level political changes. Put more 
simply, these theories claim that changes in the education, income and values of a nation 
affect the political regime of the country. In contrast, other studies address how individual 
preferences affect politics in a country. Such studies investigate the relationship between 
individual socioeconomic attributes and individual perceptions. Drawing implications 
from the macro-level studies, this paper deals with such micro-level political preferences. 
In particular, we examine whether individual socioeconomic attributes affect people’s 
preference under dominant party rule. 
Yet, it is not easy to ascertain individual preferences in the less liberalized 
societies due to limited access to information. Many countries with dominant party rule 
are oppressive, where political freedom and civil rights are constrained. People are not 
free to reveal their perceptions, especially if they are against those in power. Furthermore, 
authoritarian rulers often do not allow opinion surveys about their rule. 
The case of Singapore mitigates such problems. Singapore has been under the 
dominant rule of the People’s Action Party (PAP) since the first election after its 
independence in 1965. Major datasets in political science indicate that it has the 
characteristics of electoral authoritarianism. 2  However, its rule is not sustained by 
                                                        
1 Iversen (2010) uses the term ”new structuralist” in reference to this theory of income 
inequality and political institutions. 
2 As of 2016, Singapore has been considered as authoritarian state on the Polity IV 
Project scale (polity2 = -2) (Marshall 2017). It is classified in the category of partly free 
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violence or electoral fraud. Although the government has strong influence over the media, 
people can still express their views relatively freely. Also, surveys are not fully banned.3 
This condition enables us to collect the information about people’s perception under a 
system of dominant party rule. 
This paper aims to identify individual attributes that affect people’s political 
preferences about the dominant party rule in Singapore. For this purpose, we use data 
from the Post-Election Surveys conducted in 2011 and 2015 by the Institute of Policy 
Studies, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. The 
surveys were conducted in important years politically for Singapore. In 2011, the PAP 
gained its lowest share of the popular vote in the Parliamentary General Election in history. 
This result gave rise to debate about the possibility of political change in the near future. 
In contrast, in 2015, the PAP restored a level of support from the voters more in line with 
previous years.  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to find out the causes of the changes in 
electoral results between the two elections. However, by dealing with these two elections, 
which resulted in fairly different outcomes, we expect to find consistent factors that help 
sustain the dominant party rule regardless short-term shifts in circumstances.  
Following the arguments of the modernization theory, new structuralism, and 
value change theory, the effects of three attributes, namely, education, income and 
generation, will be examined in the paper.  
In these examinations, by means of factor analysis, we estimate factor scores to 
measure people’s preference for political plurality. Then, we examine the effects of 
individual attributes on the scores. The results show that education has a significant effect 
on individual perceptions. As modernization theory predicts, higher levels of education 
bring about stronger preference for plurality. Income also matters. Persons with lower 
incomes show significant support to the status quo, whereas the middle income group 
supports political plurality, as modernization theory predicts. Intergenerational 
                                                        
in the Freedom in the World report (Puddington and Roylance 2017), but Freedom House 
does not consider Singapore as an electoral democracy in this dataset. The Variety of 
Democracy Dataset classifies Singapore as minimally democratic in terms of liberal 
democracy, but as electoral authoritarian in terms of electoral democracy (Coppedge, 
Gerring, Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Bernhard, et al. 2017, Coppedge, Gerring, 
Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman, Andersson, et al. 2017).  
3 Poll surveys are not banned in Singapore, but there is a blackout period for electoral 
surveys during the election period. In addition, the results of exit polls are not allowed to 
be released on the polling day. See Sections 78C and 78D, The Parliamentary Election 
Act. However, in practice, few surveys are conducted.  
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differences, especially those between persons who were born before independence and 
those who were born after, result in differences in their political attitudes. The older 
generation prefers the status quo, but the younger generation supports greater plurality.  
In the following sections, we provide a theory about individual perceptions about 
political plurality. Based on this, we propose three hypotheses. Then, we examine them 
through factor analysis and multiple regressions (OLS). Finally, we summarize the 
argument in the conclusion. 
 
Modernization, New Stucturalist and Value Change Theories 
Three traditional arguments in political science—modernization theory, new 
structuralism, and value change theory—hint at two primary socioeconomic factors that 
are associated with political liberalization, education, and income (or class). Values are 
treated as an intermediate variable between socioeconomic changes (industrialization) 
and political perceptions in the value change theory.  
Initially, modernization theory asserts that economic development brings about 
democratization (Lipset 1959). In its argument, education and the middle class are crucial 
factors that are interrelated with each other and are both consequences of economic 
development. As this theory has had a strong impact, the effects of education and income 
have been empirically tested (Almond and Verba 1963, Barro 1999, Przeworski et al. 
2000, Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shleifer 2007).  
As for education, the argument is straightforward. Higher education fosters a 
value to cherish democracy. On the other hand, the arguments about income are more 
complicated. Initially, macroeconomic growth, rather than individual economic status, 
were at the center of attention.  
The emergence of the middle class in the process of modernization has also been 
paired with macro-level economic development. As the size of the middle class grows, 
the stratification structure changes. The middle class is expected to mitigate the conflict 
between the elite and non-elite, and bring about stable democracy. The middle class, with 
higher education, is also seen as holding the values of democratic rule.  
In contrast, the new structuralists emphasize the income inequality of each 
country, rather than the level of GDP per capita, as the driver of political changes, and 
view the lower income class as the key player in democratization. Their argument is 
constructed on the game theoretic situation where different classes play strategic games 
over the redistribution of wealth. In its argument, democratic institutions are a tool to 
maintain or increase the redistribution of wealth. Democratic institutions provide non-
elite veto power over policy decisions. Although they do not employ the same logic, Boix 
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(2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) assume that the lower income class prefers 
democratic institutions to reduce the exploitation by the rich and to enhance redistribution. 
On the other hand, Inglehart and Welzel (2005), advocating the value change 
theory, connect income growth with changes in values. They claim that economic 
development reduces existential threats facing society, which eventually gives rise to 
emancipative values among the people. Their argument, then, leads to intergenerational 
differences in values, especially in the post-industrialization stage. Those who were born 
after industrialization are expected to hold emancipative values, as they are free from the 
existential threats from which the older generation suffered.  
In short, modernization theory focuses on education and the middle class, while 
the new structuralists emphasize the redistribution of wealth, which the lower income 
class tries to maximize. Value change theory points out intergenerational differences. 
Although these arguments about education and income are basically about the 
impacts of socioeconomic factors on macro-level political change, they assume that 
individual socioeconomic attributes affect individual political preferences. The argument 
about intergenerational differences also deal with the impact of individual demographic 
attributes. Therefore, it is reasonable to construct hypotheses about the impacts of 
individual education level, income, and generation on individual political preferences.  
 Welzel and Inglehart (2007) emphasize the effects of mass beliefs on political 
regimes at the aggregate level, claiming that a focus on individual beliefs causes 
“individualistic fallacy,” which prevents observers from detecting the true causality. It is 
plausible that mass beliefs should be given much attention when we discuss macro-level 
political changes. Nevertheless, we also obtain useful information and clues for political 
changes when we look at individual perceptions and behaviors.4  
 
Education, Income, and Generation in the Context of Singaporean Politics  
Studies on the political order in Singapore were stimulated when the share of the 
popular votes for the PAP declined to 60.1 percent in the 2011 Parliamentary General 
Election, which was the worst result for the PAP in its history. Although the PAP could 
still secure 93.1 percent of the elected seats in the Parliament, they received only 60.1 
percent of popular votes. This is the lowest level of support received, even lower than 
                                                        
4 It is better to conduct multi-level analysis even to estimate the impacts of individual 
attributes on the individual perceptions as long as cross-national comparison is possible. 
But, since the scope of this paper is limited to the case of Singapore, the conclusion is 
applicable only in Singapore. 
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61.0 percent in the 1991 election.5 This result prompted arguments as to whether the 
2011 election started a new political era in Singapore (Tan and Lee 2011b, Tan 2012).  
 
 
 
There are several hypotheses to explain the decrease in support for the PAP, 
which are mostly based on specific issues like the opposition’s mutual collaboration and 
their leadership changes, the diffusion of the information through internet, the increase of 
foreign workers and the mismanagement of public services (Tan and Lee 2011a, Tan 
2011a, Lam Peng Er 2011, Tan 2012). Besides these specific issues, more general issues 
like intergenerational differences and widening income inequality also attracted attention 
(Tan 2011a, Lam Peng Er 2011, Welsh 2011, 2016, Tan 2012).  
Intergenerational differences are about the different behaviors between younger 
voters and older voters. Younger voters seemed to be more critical about the status quo. 
                                                        
5 Moreover, the PAP lost one group representation constituency (Aljunied), where three 
incumbent cabinet ministers were included as the PAP candidates. The PAP also lost one 
single member constituency (Hougang). Even in constituencies where the PAP won, the 
margins were very thin. 
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Figure 1. Election Results (1968-2015)
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For calculating vote shares, we exclude uncontested constituencies. 
Source: The PAP vote shares and seat shares are calculated by the author based on the 
data from the Singapore Election Department.
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These intergenerational differences, however, have been actually discussed mostly in 
connection with education levels, not as differences over political values as the value 
change theory stresses. Roughly speaking, most of the works by Singaporean scholars 
consider that the younger voters prefer more plurality due to the effects of their higher 
education level. 
Empirically, and intuitively, education seems to enhance preferences for freedom, 
plurality and political participation. However, the logic about the causality is not clear. 
Apart from the Singaporean context, Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shleifer (2007) asserts that 
education generally raises the benefits of political participation. Persons who receive 
higher education have better skills to interact with others and to persuade peers to join 
their activities and movements. However, this argument focuses on the relationship 
between education and political participation.6 The logic does not directly explain the 
correlation between education and inclination for plurality because the plurality issue is 
different from the participation issue. A possible explanation is that persons with higher 
education have the skill to collect and understand information. They have more exposure 
to the arguments and events related to democracy in other parts of the world. Access to 
such information may lead highly educated people to prefer the standard type of 
democracy with plural competition. Lam Peng Er (2011) and Tan (2012) use this logic 
for explaining the behavior of younger voters.  
Widening income inequality is also pointed out as a source of dissatisfaction with 
the status quo (Tan 2011a, Lam Peng Er 2011). Figure 2 shows the changes in the Gini 
coefficient for households, before taxes and transfers, based on Singaporean 
government’s statistics. Inequality increased steadily through 2007, and remained at the 
same level until 2012. On the other hand, Table 1 shows the distribution the Gini 
coefficient using standardized inequality, after taxes and transfers, in the cross-national 
setting by using the Standardized World Income Inequality Dataset (SWIID). Singapore 
has slightly higher inequality level as compared with the mean and the median of the 
world, but not at a considerably high level.  
Income inequality becomes a more pronounced problem when there is low social 
mobility (Ng 2011, 2013). With low social mobility, the lower income class is expected 
to be discontented with the status quo. If we follow the new structuralist theory, this 
situation pushes the lower income class to demands more plural politics under which their 
demands for redistribution and greater opportunity to climb the ladder of social hierarchy 
                                                        
6  In Singapore, voter turnout is very high because of compulsory voting and its 
geographic characteristics as a small island. The average turnout of the past twelve 
elections is 93.6 percent. 
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can be voiced.  
However, the effects of income gaps are not straightforward. The PAP has been 
providing assistance to poor residents under government social welfare programs (Rodan 
2016),7 which have redistribution effects, though these efforts may not substantially 
solve income inequality. As long as there are clientelistic payments to the lower income 
class, the PAP has a chance to earn support from them.  
 
 
Before taxes and transfers, using per household member scale.  
Source: Ministry of Finance (2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
7 For example, the government introduced the Workfare Income Supplement Scheme in 
2007, which provides cash and Central Provident Fund (CPF) contributions to lower 
income households (Rahim 2015). 
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Figure 2. Gini Coefficients of Singapore
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Table 1. Gini disposable in 2011 and 2015.  
Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max Singapore 
Gini disposable 
in 2011 
138 37.56 37.4 7.51 23.1 58.2 40.1 
Gini disposable 
in 2015 
77 36.46 36.0 8.02 22.8 57.9 39.7 
Source: Solt (2016). 
 
In contrast with the argument that discontent of the lower income class is a driver 
of political change, some scholars expect that higher income levels have positive effects 
on political liberalization. Welsh (2016) notes that the affluent class is independent of 
government support, which enables them to deviate from the status quo, unlike the lower 
income class which relies on government support. However, at the same time, Welsh 
(2016) also indicates the possibility of the opposite argument that the rich benefits from 
the policies of the incumbent government under the PAP’s dominance. The higher income 
class is the winner in Singapore under the PAP rule. It is hard to imagine that the winner 
has an incentive to deviate from the rule under which it acquired its status. If this logic 
holds, the higher income class will support the status quo.  
Modernization theory suggests the middle class would prefer more plural politics. 
In Singapore, the middle class seems to prefer plural politics in order to maintain the 
accountability of the PAP government. The middle class is vulnerable to, and feels 
frustrated by, the high and rising cost of living and lower social mobility (Weiss 2014, 
Rodan 2016). As Tan and Lee (2011a) points out, the major frustrations of citizens 
towards the government concern the increased cost of housing, congestion in public 
transportation, and inflation, all of which disproportionately affect the living standards of 
the middle class. The PAP government bears responsibility for these socioeconomic 
problems because the society and economy are strongly managed by the government in 
Singapore. It is believed that political plurality is needed to keep a check on the 
government and the PAP and to pressure them to respond to the citizens’ needs.  
As for the intergenerational differences, they are explained by the changes in 
political socialization that were brought about by the fast and drastic economic 
development of Singapore. Singapore was not secure militarily and economically when 
it acquired its independence in 1965 due to lack of natural resources, domestic conflicts 
between the English-educated and Chinse-educated populations, and external pressures 
from regional powers like Indonesia and Malaysia. By the 1970s, Singapore has achieved 
economic growth and political stability, which were seen as the achievements of the 
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dominant party rule of the PAP. On the other hand, those who were born after the period 
of Singapore’s rapid economic growth do not share the same memory. As value change 
theory claims, it is likely that the younger generation has acquired emancipative values 
as they are free from existential threats.  
Based on the above theoretical arguments and observations on the case of 
Singapore, the following three hypotheses will be examined. 
 
H1 Education: Persons who have attained a higher level of education prefer plurality, 
while those who did not are less supportive of plurality. 
 
H2 Class: (a) the modernization hypothesis: The middle class has a stronger preference 
for plurality. (b) the new structuralist hypothesis: The lower income class prefers plurality 
so that they can influence redistribution policy.  
 
H3 Generation: Older voters, who have memories of the development led by the PAP, 
prefer the status quo, while younger voters prefer plural political competition.  
 
Empirical Examinations 
In order to examine the three hypotheses above, we use the datasets of the Post-
Election Survey conducted in 2011 and 2015 by the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), Lee 
Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.8 The IPS surveys 
were conducted just after the elections in these years, 9 which captured respondents’ 
perceptions soon after they cast their votes. The surveys collected information through 
telephone polls of a random sample of 2,080 voters in 2011 and 2,015 voters in 201510.  
 Institute of Policy Studies (2011, 2015) present the results of their cluster 
analyses on its survey, which are pioneering work in the field. Their results provide a 
clear picture about the major tendencies of voters’ behaviors, and support some of the 
above-mentioned hypotheses. However, the correlations between political preferences 
and socioeconomic attributes are estimated without controlling for the effects of other 
                                                        
8 This is the most comprehensive survey in Singapore regarding voter perceptions. Welsh 
(2011, 2016) also collected extensive information about the voter behaviors, which shows 
similar trends as the IPS surveys at the descriptive level. 
9 The IPS surveys were conducted from May 8 to 20 in 2011 (the polling day was May 
7), and from September 12 to 26 in 2015 (the polling day was September 11).  
10  For additional detail on the IPS Surveys, please see 
http://lkyspp2.nus.edu.sg/ips/research/surveys.  
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variables. This paper tries to estimate the effects of each independent variable holding 
other variables constant through multiple OLS regressions. 
Our strategy is as follows. First, factor analysis is employed to estimate the factor 
scores for respondents’ preference for political plurality. Then, the scores are used as the 
dependent variable for estimating the effects of the independent variables selected based 
on the three hypotheses. 
The advantage of factor analysis, especially principal-component factor analysis, 
is to produce a single scale that represents the core of a set of variables. Instead of dealing 
with different dependent variables that are correlated with each other in different models, 
researchers can concentrate on estimating the effects on one dependent variable produced 
by factor analysis.  
For estimating factor scores, the answers to three related questions, which 
capture respondents’ perceptions about the status quo of the dominant party rule and 
preferences for plurality, are used. They are: 
 
How important are the following issues in shaping your decision on who to vote/you 
would have voted if you had to? (1: not important at all, 2: not so important, 3: neutral, 
4: important, 5: very important) 
(1) Need for checks and balances in Parliament (Checks and Balance) 
(2) Need for different views in Parliament (Different Views)  
 
Please give us your opinion on the following statements. As I read out each one, just tell 
me if you “Strongly Disagree,” “Disagree,” are “Neutral,” “Agree,” or “Strongly Agree” 
with the statement. (1: strongly disagree, 2: disagree, 3: neutral, 4: agree, 5: strongly 
agree)  
(3) It is always important to have elected opposition party members in Parliament. 
(Elected Opposition) 
 
The question about (3) Elected Opposition has different implications from those 
about (1) Checks and Balance and (2) Different Views in Singapore, because the 
Singaporean Parliament has some non-elected parliamentary members who do not enjoy 
full legislative rights, namely, the Non-Constituency Members of Parliament (NCMP) 
and the Nominated Members of Parliament (NMP). Some scholars point out that the 
introduction of these non-elected members provides advantages to the PAP because voters 
may be expected to be satisfied with merely the existence of different views in the 
parliament, even though their power is limited. In addition, opposition figures can be 
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coopted by being offered parliamentary membership (Mauzy 2002, Mauzy and Milne 
2002, Mutalib 2002, Tan 2011b, Tan 2016). Therefore, individual perceptions about 
NCMP and NMP affect the answers to (3) Elected Opposition. The variables for (1) 
Checks and Balance, (2) Different Views, and (3) Elected Opposition are by definition 
related to political plurality as they ask about the necessity of the existence of political 
players who are independent of the dominant party.11  
It is important to note that the IPS surveys avoided the word “democracy” in 
both questions and answer options. This provides a significant advantage. Perceptions 
about “democracy” havealways intertwined with other elements besides political plurality. 
For example, using the Asian Barometer dataset, Pietsch (2015) points out that the word 
“democracy” is more attached to economic development and governance in Southeast 
Asia.12 Instead, the questions on the IPS surveys deal with the issues of plurality directly, 
which avoids the influence of economic performance and governance issues. Furthermore, 
by asking specific and concrete questions, the IPS surveys mitigate the problem of 
political and social correctness, which often make respondents disguise their answers to 
conform with social norms and hide their true perceptions.  
The results of the factor analysis are presented in Tables 2 and 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
11 In addition, the IPS uses two more variables to classify respondents’ behaviors in their 
analysis (IPS 2011, 2015). The electoral system is perceived as key for sustaining PAP’s 
dominance (Mauzy 2002; Mauzy and Milne 2002; Tan 2013, 2016b). However, we do 
not include these two variables in our factor analysis due to two primary reasons. First, 
factor loadings for the two variables do not reach the standard (0.40 in absolute values) 
for including them in factor analysis. Second, it is not clear whether typical voters 
understand the effects of the electoral system on the Singaporean party system the way 
political scientists do. 
12 Interestingly, more than 90 percent of Singaporean respondents perceive their country 
as democratic, while only half of Filipino respondents answer that their country is 
democratic.  
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Table 2. Factor Analysis for Preference for Plurality 
 Variable Factor Loadings Uniqueness 
Checks and Balance 0.68 0.53 
Different Views 0.72 0.48 
Elected Opposition 0.43 0.81 
Eigenvalues 1.18 
 
Proportion  1.31   
(N=3,939, principal factors, unrotated) 
 
Table 3. Scoring coefficients (method = regression) 
Variable Factor 1 
Checks and Balance 0.37 
Different Views 0.44 
Elected Opposition 0.17 
 
The eigenvalues of Factor 1 is over 1.00, which satisfies the condition for a 
potential candidate to be a measure of the preference for plurality.13 Additionally, all 
factor loadings for Factor 1 exceed 0.40.14 Hence, it is appropriate to use Factor 1 as the 
indicator for the preference for plurality. We named this factor Plural and estimated its 
factor scores. Descriptive statistics of Plural are as shown in Table 4. And Figure 3 shows 
the histogram. 
 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics of "Plural" 
Variable N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Plural 3,939 0.00 0.80 -3.55 0.98 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
13 Eigenvalue is an indicator that shows how much of the variance of a variable is 
explained by a factor. If it is larger than 1.00, it is considered as a significant factor. 
14 Factor loading shows how clusters of variables are related to a factor. A larger loading 
implies that it is a better indicator of the factor. Acock (2016) recommends that items with 
a loading value over 0.40 for a factor can be considered a good indicator of the factor.  
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Figure 3. Histogram of “Plural” 
 
 
Using these factor scores with Plural as the dependent variable, we examine the 
four hypotheses by using multiple OLS regressions. The main specification is expressed 
as follows: 
 
Plural=β0+β1(Education)+β2(Income)+β3(Income)2+β3(Post-independence) 
+ β4 (controls) +u 
 
The quadratic component of Income is added to test the non-linear effects of 
income. If the middle class has the strong preference of plurality, the effects of income is 
expected to be an inverted U-shaped curve, or at least an elastic curve. 
The independent variables are as follows: 
 
(1) Education: 
Education levels are classified into five groups; 1 (Primary School or below), 2 
(Secondary), 3 (Post-secondary), 4 (Polytechnic and Arts Institution Diploma), and 5 
(University/Post-graduate/other professional qualification). 
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(2) Income: 
Income clusters are produced based on the following monthly household income in 
$SGD: 1 ($0 to $1,999), 2 ($2,000 to 4,999), 3 ($5,000 to $6,900), and 4 ($7,000 or 
above). 
(3) Post-independence: 
Age groups are classified into nine ranges: 2 (21–24), 3 (25–29), 4 (30–34), 5 (35–
39), 6 (40–44), 7 (45–49), 8 (50–54), 9 (55–64), and 10 (65 years old or older). Based 
on the age groups, the generational variable Post-independence is generated to test 
the intergenerational differences. Those who are 21–44 years old in the 2011 survey 
or 21–49 years old in the 2015 survey are assigned a value of 1, otherwise 0. This 
variable indicates the new generation who went through political socialization after 
economic development. 
 
As control variables, we use ethnicity, gender, naturalization, and year. Ethnicity 
is still regarded as the major cleavage in the society, as ethnic minorities seem to have 
dissatisfaction with the status quo as the result of their group identity.15 Gender is also 
included to control the effects of the gender gap. As for naturalization, persons who 
become naturalized citizens are expected to have positive impressions about the status 
quo because they acquired Singaporean citizenship by their own choice. We also control 
for year effects to avoid the influence of year specific events.  
Ethnic Majority is a dummy variable, where a value of 1 is given if the person is 
ethnic Chinese; otherwise, we give the value of 0, which means the respondent belongs 
to a different ethnicity, such as Malay or Indian. Male indicates the respondent’s gender, 
which is 1 if the person is male and 0 otherwise. For New Citizen, a naturalized person is 
given a value of 1, otherwise 0. A year dummy for 2011 is also included to control the 
influence of year specific events.  
                                                        
15 As a socioeconomic identity, ethnicity is considered important in Singapore (Welsh 
2011, 2016). A majority of residents are ethnic Chinese, and this group comprises 74.1 
percent of the residents as of 2010. The second largest group is ethnic Malays (13.4 
percent), followed by ethnic Indians (9.2 percent) and others (3.3 percent) (Singapore 
Department of Statistics 2011). Mauzy and Milne (2002) claim that ethnic minorities feel 
left behind in terms of social status. Fetzer (2008) also points out the difference between 
ethnic groups. Nonetheless, he indicates that ethnic polarization between Chinse and 
Malays is getting lower in the recent years. Welsh (2011) also discusses the role of ethnic 
grouping. 
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Table 5 shows descriptive statistics for the independent variables and controls, 
while Table 6 shows their correlations. 
 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables and Controls 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Education 4,052 3.26 1.41 1.00 5.00 
Income 3,756 2.51 1.05 1.00 4.00 
Post-ind. 4,094 0.57 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Age 4,094 6.28 2.50 2.00 10.00 
Ethnic Majority 4,094 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Male 4,094 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 
New Citizen 4,094 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
 
Table 6. Correlations of Independent Variables and Controls 
  
Education Income 
Post-
ind. 
Ethnic 
Majority 
Male 
New 
Citizen 
Education 1.00 
     
Income 0.50 1.00 
    
Post-ind. 0.41 0.19 1.00    
Ethnic Majority 0.08 0.14 0.09 1.00 
  
Male 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.02 1.00 
 
New Citizen 0.08 0.02 0.10 -0.03 0.01 1.00 
(N=3,743) 
 
Education shows relatively higher correlations with Income and Post-
independence. However, this correlation is not high enough to cause the problem of 
multicollinearity. 
 
Results 
Table 7 shows the results of multiple OLS regressions using these variables. 
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Table 7. The Effects of Individual Attributes on Preference for Political Plurality 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.  
Variables
Education 0.06 *** 0.04 ** 0.04 ** 0.03 **
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Income 0.08 *** 0.33 *** 0.27 *** 0.27 ***
(0.01) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Income squared -0.05 *** -0.04 ** -0.04 **
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Lowe Income -0.24 *** -0.17 ***
(0.04) (0.04)
Age -0.03 *** -0.01 *
(0.01) (0.01)
Post-Independence 0.14 *** 0.08 ** 0.08 **
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Ethnic Majority -0.24 *** -0.25 *** -0.25 *** -0.24 *** -0.21 *** -0.22 *** -0.25 *** -0.24 *** -0.25 ***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Male 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
New Citizen -0.15 *** -0.13 ** -0.13 ** -0.12 ** -0.10 * -0.11 ** -0.13 ** -0.13 ** -0.14 **
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Year 2011 0.09 ** 0.10 *** 0.10 *** 0.08 ** 0.07 ** 0.09 ** 0.08 ** 0.08 ** 0.09 **
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant -0.05 -0.06 -0.33 *** 0.18 *** 0.29 *** 0.04 -0.25 * 0.00 -0.38 ***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.09) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.11) (0.05) (0.09)
N 3,901 3,629 3,629 3,629 3,939 3,939 3,616 3,616 3,616
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04
Model 8Model 4 Model 7 Model 9Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 5 Model 6
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For Model 1 to Model 6, each independent variable is tested separately. The signs 
of the coefficients of all independent variables indicate the predicted directions of H1, 
H2(a) and H3. The coefficients are statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level.  
Model 1 simply indicates that higher level of education bring about the 
preference for plurality.  
While Model 2 estimates the linear effects of income, Model 3 uses a quadratic 
term of income to estimate its nonlinear effects. Model 4 uses a binary variable for lower 
income class. Model 3 and Model 4 indicate that the middle class prefers plurality, while 
the lower income class supports the status quo.  
Model 5 and Model 6 tested the effects of generations by using both Age and 
Post-independence. Model 5 indicates the linear effects of age, which indicates that the 
status quo is preferred as age increases. Model 6 implies that there are generational 
differences, with the younger generation born after independence seeming to prefer more 
plurality. 
In Model 7, Model 8, and Model 9, all independent variables are included in the 
estimations. Model 9 is the main specification presented above. Model 7 uses Age instead 
of Post-independence, and Model 8 uses Lower Income instead of the quadratic term of 
income. Across all the models, there are no contradictions in the results observed. They 
are consistent with the predictions of H1, H2(a), and H3. The results for the examination 
of the three hypotheses are summarized as follows. 
 
(1) H1 Education 
The effects of Education are statistically significant in all models. For the main 
specification in Model 9, the results indicate that the effects are significant even after 
controlling other variables. The coefficients indicate that higher levels of education 
bring about stronger preferences for plurality. The results support H1.  
 
(2) H2 Class 
Income also has a significant effect on preferences for plurality. Moreover, as the 
quadratic term shows significantly negative coefficients in Model 3, Model 7 and 
Model 9, the effects of income are shown to be an elastic curve. On the other hand, 
Model 4 and Model 8 imply that the lower income class supports the status quo. Figure 
4 shows its predictive margins with 95 percent confidence intervals. Strong support 
for the status quo is observed among the lower income class, while the upper middle 
class has a significant inclination toward plurality. H2(a), the modernization 
hypothesis, is supported by this estimation, while the H2(b), the new structuralist 
hypothesis, is not. 
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Figure 4. Predictive Margins with 95% Confidence Intervals 
 
 
(3) H3 Generation  
The intergeneration difference has a significant effect in Model 5 to Model 9. In 
particular, the dichotomous variable Post-independence has a significant effect in the 
main model, Model 9, even after controlling other variables. As H3 indicates, the 
younger generation prefers more plurality, while the older generation supports the 
status quo.  
 
The intergenerational differences are expected to be stronger in 2015 because the 
passing of Lee Kuan Yew and the 50th anniversary of Singapore’s independence reminded 
the older generation of the early days of independence and the succeeding period. 
However, by pooling the data of the 2011 and the 2015 surveys and controlling for the 
year effects, the estimations indicate the consistent existence of intergenerational 
differences. Furthermore, the estimations imply that the effects of intergenerational 
differences are independent of education and income. Model 8 and Model 9 indicate the 
statistically significant effects of age even after controlling for the effects of education 
and income. This implies that the intergenerational differences are caused by differences 
in the political socialization of each generation, rather than educational attainment.  
 
 
Conclusion 
Empirical studies on political liberalizations are mostly cross-national 
examinations using national-level data. Although aggregated data are important to check 
for differences between countries, individual behavior, which is the basis of regime 
changes, are not given much attention in these studies. On the other hand, studies that 
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deal with micro-level data are often conducted in already liberalized countries because of 
data availability. Their implications are limited because these data provide information 
about the differences within a group of countries that share a similar political situation of 
liberalized competition.  
By examining the data of Singapore, where dominant party rule has continued 
for several decades, we were able to obtain information about individual behavior under 
a political regime where political competition is controlled by the government. Through 
the examinations above, we identify at least three crucial factors that influence people’s 
attitudes towards the dominant party rule in Singapore. These factors are education, 
income/class, and intergenerational differences in values. The results confirm the 
effectiveness of modernization theory, and that of its modified version that emphasizes 
the differences in political culture between generations.  
Nevertheless, it is still difficult to say which of the two elections, 2011 or 2015, 
shows the “normal” situation in Singapore. Also, we still do not have enough information 
to predict the future of Singaporean politics.16 More qualitative data on the perceptions 
and behaviors of citizens are necessary. Such data also provide us with deeper knowledge 
about the causal mechanisms that result in socioeconomic changes driving political 
changes.  
 
  
                                                        
16 There are two main predictions for the future of Singaporean politics. The first is 
“strong state democratization” (Slater 2012). Under this scenario, the PAP will give up its 
status of dominant party and will become merely a ruling party that controls a simple 
majority in the Parliament. The second possibility is the continuation of the PAP’s 
dominance. Voters punish the PAP if its performance does not maintain the expected 
standards, but they still generally prefer that the PAP remain in power. The opposition is 
expected to be used as a device to check the PAP’s performance and to provide the PAP 
with a fear of a transition in power following disappointing performance. (Lam Peng Er 
2016). 
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